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CLIENT COUNSELING, MEDIATION, AND 
ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
ROBERT RUBINSON* 
This article examines how litigation and mediation have distinct 
narrative structures and what these narratives say about counseling 
clients about mediation. In the narrative of litigation, parties struggle 
against one another in order to convince a decision maker of the truth 
of "what happened." This struggle is about more than designating 
liability; it is about enabling the decision-maker to restore social or-
der and vindicate morality. In contrast, the narrative of mediation 
does not call upon the mediator to designate "truth" or "right" and 
"wrong." Rather, the mediator acts to enable parties to overcome 
and transform conflict through collaboration. In the mediation nar-
rative, parties do not struggle against one another, but all mediation 
participants - including the mediator herself - struggle collabora-
tively to overcome and transform conflict. A challenge for counsel-
ing clients about mediation is that the litigation narrative reflects 
deeply-held cultural norms about conflict resolution. This article ar-
gues that lawyers must confront and dislodge this underlying narra-
tive of litigation in order to engage clients in a meaningful inquiry 
about mediation. The article concludes with concrete suggestions-a 
"toolkit"-for engaging clients in this kind of narrative reframing of 
their disputes. 
The wind was flapping a temple flag, and two monks were having an 
argument about it. One said the flag was moving, the other that the 
wind was moving; and they could come to no agreement on the mat-
ter. They argued back and forth. Eno the Patriarch said, "It is not 
that the wind is moving; it is not that the flag is moving; it is that 
your honorable minds are moving.1 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author 
gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professors Michele E. Gilman, Alan Kirtley, 
Cheri Wyron Levin and Jane C. Murphy, as well as Professors Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Jerome Bruner, and Peggy Cooper Davis and participants in New York University School 
of Law's Lawyering Theory Workshop, at which an earlier version of this Article was 
presented. The author also expresses gratitude to Randi E. Schwartz for her invaluable 
support throughout this project. 
1 Platform Sutra, quoted in TIMOTHY FERRIS, COMING OF AGE IN THE MILKY WAY 15 
(1988). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
What a dispute is - its relevant facts and plausible resolutions - is 
contingent upon whether a dispute will be litigated or mediated. This 
notion - an idea that this article will elaborate in detaiF - generates 
extraordinary opportunities for lawyers to enrich how they and their 
clients approach dispute resolution. This opportunity, however, will 
be squandered if lawyers merely recast mediation in adversarial 
terms.3 Rather, lawyers need to rethink what they do and how they 
do it in light of how mediation creates and resolves disputes in ways 
that are utterly alien to the norms of advocacy. 
This is no easy task. The core activity that has defined what it 
means to be a lawyer in popular imagination for centuries is the tria1.4 
Trials are such a fixture in the cultural and legal landscape that it is 
easy to overlook how trials embody a very specific view of the world. 
Any trial - criminal, tort, contract - is a contest about which party's 
story reflects th~ "truth" about "what happened." Given that two in-
consistent truths cannot exist simultaneously,S establishing the "truth" 
of one party's story necessarily disproves the "truth" of an adversary's 
story. Participants in contests also believe passionately that they are 
right and that others are wrong, often to the extent that they are mor-
ally right and others are morally wrong. Effective lawyers generate 
this passion (whether real or feigned) and seek to win the contest by 
convincing a decision-maker not only that a client's story is "true," but 
that this story embodies the triumph of right over wrong.6 Moreover, 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 34-110. 
3 To a certain extent, such recasting has already occurred in certain forms or "styles" 
of mediation. For a discussion of this process, see infra text accompanying notes 65, 111-
16. 
4 Carol Clover, Law and the Order of Popular Culture, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF 
CULTURE 97 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1998). 
5 This assumption is a standard piece of folk wisdom that figures prominently in every-
day interpretations of how the world works. MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION: 1M· 
PLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS 7-8 (1993) (describing an aspect of "The 
Moral Law Folk Theory" as "[t]here must be one and only one correct conceptualization 
for any situation"). In adjudication, the same notions are usually understood through an 
assumption that "truth is a matter of accuracy, a matter of reflecting an objective, external 
reality." Milner S. Ball, Wrong Experiment, Wrong Result: An Appreciatively Critical Re-
sponse to Schwartz, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 569-71 (1983). These ideas are for-
mally embodied in three principles of logic ultimately derived from Aristotle: "the law of 
identity," which holds that "A equals A"; "the law of noncontradiction," through which 
"no statement can be both true and false"; and "the law of the excluded middle," through 
which "any statement is either true or false; thus, A or B, and not A and B." Kaiping Peng 
& Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Dialectics, and Reasoning about Contradiction, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 741, 744 (1999). 
6 A "contest" also describes other types of discourse that are culturally pervasive: 
politics, debates in the academy, morning news shows, talk shows, domestic disputes. Car-
rie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicul-
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while trials are only the culmination of the litigation process and to an 
increasing extent rarely happen at all,7 the set of assumptions underly-
ing trial practice inform virtually everything else that advocates do. 
Developing, supporting, and proving a story determine how advocates 
perform client interviewing, discovery, motion practice, negotiation.s 
These ideas are so basic as to approach banality. Their very ba-
nality, however, masks how trials are not things of nature but contin-
gent, culturally defined events. The world need not be put together 
this way. Indeed, to an increasing extent, the world of dispute resolu-
tion is not put together this way. The reason is the rapid growth of 
mediation9 - a process built upon profoundly different premises than 
litigation.1° While the growth of mediation has spawned an enormous 
multiplicity of practices performed under its name,11 many forms of 
mediation are not a contest of one party against another, nor presume 
that one "story" has an exclusive claim to "truth," nor claim that get-
ting to "what happened" should furnish the basis upon which to re-
solve disputes. Instead, mediation is pragmatism in action: mediators 
facilitate the resolution of differences through strategies that have the 
potential to facilitate the resolution of differences. Very often such a 
resolution entails the recognition of an adversary's perspective, not its 
obliteration as false. 12 
This article examines these issues through the lens of narrative 
theory. My central thesis is that litigation and mediation each embody 
a narrative that shapes, orders, and controls the meaning of the "dis-
pute" at issue. I first explore recent advances in narrative theory and 
demonstrate how litigation and mediation entail a process that can be 
described narratively and how this process profoundly influences what 
tural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 11 (1996). 
7 David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Hebert M. Kritzer & Joel B. 
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A L. REV. 72, 89 (1993) (noting 
that trials are "rare" and most cases resolve through settlement); Kent D. Syverud, ADR 
and the Decline of the American Civil Jury, 44 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1935 (1997). See also 
Hope Viner Sanborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 AB.A J. 24 (2002). 
8 The role of "contest" extends to legal education. The first-year curriculum - the best 
gauge there is of the conventional wisdom of what "thinking like a lawyer" means - has 
not changed much in 125 years. The operative procedure is that of a contest: majority and 
dissenting opinions are contested, students contest the efficacy of different rules, the 
teacher contests the understanding of students. See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System of 
Law Practice and Law Teaching, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570,582 (1983) (describing "the famil-
iar tilt in the law curriculum toward preparing students for legal contest"). 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 52-63. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 72-91. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 57-68. My discussion of mediation adheres to the 
traditional conception that has been identified as "facilitative" in recent literature. See 
infra text accompanying note 65. Unless noted otherwise, subsequent references to "medi-
ation" refer to this model of mediation practice. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 76-81. 
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stories are told within that process. The article then explores the prac-
tical application of these ideas when lawyers counsel clients. Given 
that a lawyer can generate insights about what a dispute is or can be 
by describing different ways that a dispute can be resolved, the narra-
tives of litigation and mediation enable clients to better understand 
that litigation is a choice, and not always the most prudent choice, in 
resolving disputes. 
By comparing narratives in litigation and mediation in this man-
ner, I am not suggesting that lawyers should view mediation as supe-
rior to litigation in some essentialist sense. This is far too reductive, 
and many students of conflict resolution going back to Lon Fuller 
have rejected such an all or nothing approach.13 Moreover, in some 
instances mediation can be not only inappropriate, but affirmatively 
damaging.14 Rather, my approach -like those of others - draws upon 
what is probably the central insight of American pragmatism: "ideas 
. . . are tools - like forks and knives and microchips - that people 
devise to cope with the world in which they find themselves."15 For 
my purposes, the knives and forks and microchips are processes to 
resolve controversy. The "people" doing the devising are the attorney 
and client collaborating through counseling. The challenge as I see it, 
then, is not merely to educate law students16 and practitioners17 about 
mediation or to create an ethical obligation to counsel clients about 
alternative forms of dispute resolution,18 but, rather, to examine the 
13 For an excellent summary of how the intellectual originators of ADR theory - in-
cluding Fuller, Soia Mentschikoff, and the legal process theorists Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks - approached these questions, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of 
Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000). 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
15 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB xi (2001). In the context of dispute res-
olution theory, this idea is also often called "fitting the forum to the fuss." Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 13, at 25. 
16 Terri Durrett & Marc Tittlebaum, Report of the Working Group on the Proposed 
Ethical Duty to Recommend Alternative Dispute Resolution, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 65, 68 
(1999); Lea B. Vaughn, Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) into the Curricu-
lum at the University of Washington School of Law: A Report and Reflections, 50 FLA. L. 
REV. 679 (1998). 
17 Suzanne J. Schmitz, Giving Meaning to the Second Generation of ADR Education: 
Attorneys'Duty To Learn About ADR and What They Must Learn, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 
29. 
18 Some commentators have argued that ethics rules should mandate attorneys to ad-
vise clients of the availability of ADR. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, ADR, the ABA, and 
Client Control: A Proposal that the Model Rules Require Lawyers to Present ADR Options 
to Clients, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 183 (1999); Carol VanAuken-Haight & Pamela Chapman 
Einslen, Attorney Duty to Inform Clients of ADR?, 72 MICH. B.J. 1038 (1993). New lan-
guage adopted as one of the "Ethics 2000" amendments to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct move in this direction. MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cm!. (2002) 
("when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be necessary ... to inform the client of 
forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation"). 
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nuts and bolts of how to counsel clients about choices for dispute reso-
lution - the tools for describing the tools. 
With this challenge in mind, the article concludes by proposing 
strategies for how lawyers can and should counsel clients about medi-
ation. By embracing narrative possibilities in constructing disputes, 
such "mediation-talk" generates opportunities for lawyers to enrich a 
client's sense of what a dispute is or could be which, in turn, empowers 
clients to make informed choices about which dispute resolution pro-
cess can best promote client values and goals. 
II. THE GUIDE FOR THE INVESTIGATION: NARRATIVE THEORY 
This Section will summarize the role that ideas about narrative 
have played in legal theory and current thinking about how narrative 
relates to cognition. It goes on to describe what a narrative is - a 
definition that will form the basis for my succeeding analysis of the 
narratives of Litigation and Mediation. 
A. The Uses of Narrative 
Much has been written and debated about the usefulness of ideas 
about narrative to understanding judging and lawyering,19 and, very 
recently, to how mediators can mediate effectively as welPo Without 
entering into the details of these debates, narrative theory, at a mini-
mum, can powerfully describe adjudication and dispute resolution 
generally. Scholars have used narrative to explain how judges and ju-
ries determine "the facts of the case,"21 how lawyers persuade deci-
sion-makers of the merits of their clients' cause,22 and how judges 
Some have also argued that the failure to advise clients about alternatives to litigation 
should constitute legal malpractice. Robert F. Cochran, Legal Representation and the Next 
Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to 
Control Negotiation and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 
(1990). 
19 A particularly influential and important work on narrative and the law is Robert 
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1983). The extension of narrative as a method of legal scholarship has attracted 
particular attention. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: 
An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
20 See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW Ap· 
PROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2001). While providing valuable insights into media· 
tion techniques through the lens of stories disputants tell in mediation, this work neither 
addresses attorney-client counseling nor mediation and litigation narratives at the defini-
tionallevel that is the focus of this article. See infra text accompanying notes 33-110. 
21 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991). 
22 Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681 
(1994); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall's Image of the Blue-Eyed Child in 
Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 226 (1993). 
838 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:833 
construct persuasive opinions.23 
Among the many insights developed in this literature is how mis-
leading it is to conceive of legal analysis strictly in terms of logic and 
rationality.24 To take one example, the judicial system tends to as-
sume that jurors - chosen with an eye to having an "open mind" -
assess the weight and credibility of individual pieces of testimonial 
and physical evidence at trial. This process ultimately produces (so 
the assumption goes) "findings of fact" driven by evidence and un-
tainted by the outside world. However, as the theoretical and empiri-
cal work of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie demonstrate, "jurors 
impose a narrative story organization on trial information."25 Pen-
nington and Hastie make two critical points: 1) jurors interpret evi-
dence in the context of stories they construct, and 2) these stories are 
the products of "experience and beliefs in the social world" that exist 
independently of what happens at trial.26 Lest this conclusion be dis-
missed as merely confirming the oft-maligned "irrationality" of how 
jurors decide cases, scholars have persuasively shown how judges -
including judges of the United States Supreme Court - reach decisions 
in exactly the same wayP 
The underlying message here is not that jurors and judges are 
doing their work badly; the message is that this is the only way that 
jurors and judges can do their work at all. To make the point more 
explicitly, "stories are not just recipes for stringing together a set of 
'hard facts'" but rather "stories construct the facts that comprise 
them."28 What Pennington and Hastie argue that jurors do is what we 
all do.29 
23 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 143-164 (2000). 
While ostensibly drawing upon pure reason - or at least the subspecies of pure reason 
called "legal reasoning" - the persuasive power of judicial opinions can be viewed as aris-
ing from their subtle evocation of mythic stock stories and rhetorical devices that carry 
within them embedded cultural norms. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial 
Woman, 48 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 7 (1993). 
24 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between Legal 
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989) ("[t]he attraction of 
narrative is that it corresponds more closely to the manner in which the human mind 
makes sense of experience than does the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law"). This 
use of narrative is part of a larger, ongoing assault on the legitimacy of standard legal 
analysis - an assault that is both traced in and exemplified by PIERRE SCHLAG, THE EN-
CHANTMENT OF REASON (1998). . 
25 See, e.g., Pennington & Hastie, supra note 21, at 521. 
26 Id. at 525. 
27 See generally Amsterdam, supra note 22; AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23; 
Davis, supra note 23. 
28 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 111 (emphasis in original). See also Je-
rome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4 (1991). 
29 Indeed, to a perhaps surprising degree, the process of narrative construction begins 
even when children are just beginning to acquire language skills. See NARRATIVES FROM 
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While the purposes and origins of narrative are unsettled and 
complex questions, one function of narrative is particularly significant 
for purposes of this article. Narrative is a primary mechanism through 
which we explain breaches, violations, or deviations from a norm.30 
Such events are tales told by storytellers (that is, all of us) every day: 
difficulties at work or at home, newspaper or magazine "stories," 
things that go awry in life or things that go especially well. Going to 
the grocery store and buying what you need is not a story; going to the 
grocery store and getting into an argument about a price, or waiting 
on the checkout line for two hours, or witnessing the arrest of a shop-
lifter, or forgetting to bring an umbrella in a downpour, or getting a 
spectacularly good buy on an item, are stories potentially worth tell-
ing. All involve experiences that deviate however modestly from the 
usual and the expected.31 Of course, stories may be far more than 
anecdotes about shopping. Stories can and do tell of national or relig-
ious origins or strivings, or of history, or of the arc of one's own life.32 
B. The "Austere Definition" of Narrative 
If humans employ stories to describe experience and "reality" 
and stories, in turn, constitute experience and "reality," narrative 
structure becomes a question well worth investigating. While defining 
the universal attributes of narrative is far from settled (assuming, of 
course, that it can ever be truly settled), I will adopt what Anthony 
Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner have called the "Austere Definition" 
of narrative. The Austere Definition embodies what is largely uncon-
troversial in current thinking on narrative. While some would argue 
that narrative is more than this, it is difficult to argue that it is less. 
Here is the Austere Definition: 
A narrative ... needs a cast of human-like characters, beings capa-
ble of willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, 
having feelings. It also needs a plot with a beginning, a middle, and 
an end, in which particular characters are involved in particular 
events. The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or explicitly): 
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness of 
THE CRIB (Katherine Nelson ed., 1989); JUDY DUNN, THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL UNDER-
STANDING (1988). 
30 Bruner, supra note 28, at 11. 
31 Jerome Bruner has characterized this aspect of narrative as embodying "canonicity 
and breach": "to be worth telling, a tale must be about how an implicit canonical script has 
been breached, violated, or deviated from in a manner to do violence to ... the 'legitimacy' 
of the canonical script." Bruner, supra note 28, at 11. 
32 See Louis O. Mink, Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument, in THE WRITING OF 
HISTORY: LITERARY FORM AND HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING 129-149 (Robert H. Ca-
nary & Henry Kozicki, eds. 1978); Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Represen-
tation of Reality, 7 CRITICAL INQUIRY 5 (1980). 
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things 
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circumstances at-
tributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human 
intervention, 
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which suc-
ceed or fail, 
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed) 
steady state is created, 
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the 
tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through 
some coda - say, for example, Aesop's characteristic moral of the 
story.33 
While austere, among the fascinating dimensions of this defini-
tion is that it contains several disjunctive "or" statements. These in-
clude Trouble "attributable to human agency or susceptible to change 
by human intervention," Efforts at "redress or transformation," and a 
steady state that is ultimately either "restored" or "transformed." 
More on these crucial forks in the road shortly. 
With these basic insights of narrative theory in mind, we can now 
turn to the contexts of litigation and mediation to help build a fresh 
view of the meaning of conflict and conflict resolution. 
III. THE STORY OF LITIGATION 
So what is the Story of Litigation? One way of approaching this 
question is to conceive of litigation as itself a mechanism for story 
completion. Each litigant arrives with an unfinished, inconsistent 
story, and the job of a judge or jury is to finish telling the story the 
"right" way. The mechanics of this process, however, only hint at the 
type of story parties seek to prove in litigation. At this level, partici-
pants in litigation draw from a deeper or "meta-narrative" about each 
party's struggle to vindicate good over evil. 
A. The Stories of Litigation 
Let's start as narrative itself starts, with the Steady State and the 
Trouble that upsets the Steady State: The world is in order. People 
are acting towards each other as they should, or at least no one is 
straying too far from the norm. And then ... something happens. 
One party34 claims that another party did something to generate dis-
order, to make the world out of joint. In other words, Trouble dis-
33 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 113-14 (emphasis in original). 
34 For purposes of clarity, I will assume a two party dispute in this discussion. Needless 
to say, litigation often involves multiple parties as co-defendants, co-plaintiffs, or parties in 
third-party practice. Such additional parties may generate additional narratives as against 
individual parties. 
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rupts the Steady State. In a breach of contract case, the parties enter 
into a contract (Steady State) and then one party breaches the contract 
(TroubLe). In a tort case, plaintiff is walking on the sidewalk (Steady 
State) and then slips and falls (TroubLe), or plaintiff is having a beer 
(Steady State) and then defendant slugs plaintiff (TroubLe). In a crimi-
nal case, a bank is doing what banks ordinarily do (Steady State) and 
then is held up by a defendant armed with a gun (TroubLe). The de-
fendant claims either that: 1) nothing happened, and an attempt to 
demonstrate otherwise is itself an example of disorder and thus of 
TroubLe, and/or 2) something did happen to generate disorder, but it 
was the other party that did it. 
So who is right and who is wrong, or, to put it in terms of the 
Austere Definition, who is the real source of TroubLe? The assump-
tion that one party is right and one party is wrong is not open to ques-
tion; litigation is based on a shared norm among all participants 
(litigants, judge, jury) that only one of the litigants is right about 
"what happened." Since there is only one true source of TroubLe, par-
ties expend Efforts to demonstrate to the finder of fact that their story 
is the "right" one.35 These Efforts are subsumed within the proce-
dures of litigation itself. Parties are successful in their Efforts to the 
extent the judge (or jury) decides that the origins of TroubLe are as a 
party claims. Thus, the end result of successful Efforts is that a judge 
or jury Restores the Steady State by granting relief to the party whose 
version of TroubLe is the right one. 
To recapitulate, parties first come to litigation with divergent ver-
sions of TroubLe. The court's job is to finish the story the "right" way 
so that a party's story makes sense. A bare bones representation of 
this narrative scheme would be as follows: 
Joe's Story 
Steady State [already happened]: Dave and I were talking. 
Trouble [already happened]: Dave punched me. 
Efforts [is happening]: I am showing and will show that Dave owes 
me money for my injuries. 
Restoration of Steady State [should happen]: Dave pays me money. 
Coda [should happen]: Justice is done. 
Dave's Story 
Steady State [already happened]: Joe and I were talking. 
Trouble [already happened]: Joe swung his arm to punch me. As a 
35 A leading text on trial advocacy describes developing a theory of the case as an 
"ongoing process of developing logical, consistent positions on disputed facts and integrat-
ing them harmoniously with the undisputed facts to create a persuasive story of what really 
happened." THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 508 (6th ed. 2002). 
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reflex, I hit him. 
Efforts [is happening): I am showing and will show that this case 
must be dismissed. 
Restoration of Steady State [should happen): This case is dismissed. 
Coda [should happen]: Justice is done. 
Once the litigation is concluded, the "true" plot of the story can now 
be told completely and definitively. Either Joe's right, or Dave's right, 
or some combination thereof is right. Such a story - its fuzziness and 
indeterminacy stripped away - is familiar to every first-year law stu-
dent, for this is almost invariably the narrative told in judicial 
opinions:36 
Steady State: Facts of Case. 
Trouble: Facts of Case. 
Efforts: Procedural History. 
Restoration/Transformation of Steady State: Decision of court/entry 
of judgment. 
Coda: Justice is done.37 
Even this brief tour highlights an important dimension of litiga-
tion. The engine that drives litigation is a kind of anxiety about story 
completion. "Facts" need to be "found." The goal of an advocate is 
to persuade the decision-maker that the advocate's story is the right 
one, and if the advocate's story is the right one, then the "ending" -
that is, the Restoration or Transformation of the Steady State - flows 
from it.38 In this sense, the Efforts are a contest about who caused the 
Trouble, and "finding" who did determines what the proper Restora-
tion should be. For example, a plaintiff in a tort case seeks to con-
vince the decision-maker that the Trouble was due to defendant's 
negligence. If it is, the rest of the story must be a judgment by the 
judge or jury in favor of plaintiff in order to return plaintiff to the 
Steady State before the Trouble began. End of story. Another ending 
- entry of judgment in favor of the defendant - would feel hollow and 
wrong in light of this decision-maker's understanding of the Steady 
36 I have argued elsewhere that this retelling necessarily distorts the narrative indeter-
minacy that is the hallmark of contested litigation prior to the rendering of a judicial deci-
sion. Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of Judicial 
Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3,4 (1996). 
37 The final component - the Coda - reaffirms the power of law to restore the moral 
and, by extension, social order. While on occasion explicitly referred to in judicial opin-
ions, the Coda is most frequently implied. 
38 This point recalls Ronald Dworkin's notion that lines of precedent constitute a con-
tinuing story. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986). My concern, however, is 
not with appellate or even judicial decision-making per se, but with how the narrative of 
litigation influences the resolution of conflict. 
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State and Trouble. Unless, of course, you view the Trouble as not be-
ing caused by defendant's negligence and the Trouble as the com-
mencement of meritless litigation by the Plaintiff: in that case, entry of 
judgment in favor of the defendant would seem to be the natural 
ending.39 
B. The Story of Litigation as Morality Tale 
The competing stories at issue in litigation tend to have common 
elements. Recall the disjunctive elements in the Austere Definition.40 
The first disjunctive element relates to the nature of the Trouble - that 
it consists "of circumstances attributable to human agency or suscepti-
ble to change by human intervention." In litigation, the crux of virtu-
ally all claims is that the Trouble for which redress is sought must be 
attributable to a human agent.41 Otherwise the whole point of litiga-
tion - in civil cases, the ordering of one or more parties to do or give 
something for the benefit of one or more parties, or, in criminal cases, 
the imposition of a penalty - would be meaningless. 
Moreover, and this is critical, the premise of a claim in litigation 
is that circumstances are virtually always attributable to a morally cor-
rupted human agency. Acts that constitute contested facts in litigation 
- commission of an intentional or unintentional tort, violation of a 
statute with corresponding civil or criminal penalties, breaching a con-
tract - are almost invariably framed as moral failings.42 Things do not 
39 It has been noted that sensitivity to this aspect of narrative - its ability to foreclose 
the possibility of alternative endings - is the hallmark of effective advocacy. See Sara 
Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The Construction and Transfor-
mation of Narratives in Community Mediation, 11 STUD. L. POL. & Soc. 69, 72 (1991); 
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 133. 
40 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
41 The exceptions - no fault divorce, no fault automobile insurance - are remarkable in 
that they are so few and their adoption was enormously difficult and controversial because 
they are so discordant with the "story" I am describing. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN & 
LANCE LIEBMAN, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS: CASE STUDIES 309-335 
(1988) (describing the legislative hurdles facing proponents of no fault automobile 
insurance ). 
42 Empirical evidence also suggests that litigants themselves associate litigation - as 
opposed to more informal means of dispute resolution - in moral terms. See Sally Engle 
Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?: Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 
JUST. Sys. J. 151, 172 (1984) (in conducting an ethnographic study of three small American 
neighborhoods, authors found that when "[w]hen people do bring interpersonal disputes to 
court, they tend to be ... problems in which the moral values at stake appear sufficiently 
important to outweigh the condemnation" associated with commencing litigation). It is 
interesting to note that there are powerful public policy reasons to avoid this explicitly 
"moral" discourse in divorce, Worker's Compensation, and automobile accident litigation -
the rare areas of law that are explicitly "no fault." See, e.g., HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra 
note 41, at 310-312 (1988) (discussing the expense, volume, and imprecision of personal 
injury cases involving automobiles and the trend towards "no-fault" cases); Jane C. Mur-
phy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in 
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happen situationally, or circumstantially, or because of divergent per-
spectives and experiences on seemingly "identical" events.43 
This moral dimension ups the ante of the rest of the story. The 
Efforts at redress now take on the gravity of a moral crusade, with the 
court (judge, jury or both) cast as the hero empowered to restore 
moral order to the world. As a result, the Restoration of the Steady 
State takes on the seriousness of righting a moral universe that is out 
of joint due to the immoral acts of another party. And, of course, it is 
almost inevitable that a party defending against a claim of moral cul-
pability will fight back in kind by labeling the other party as a morally 
culpable agent who is asserting a meritless claim, or, in a standard 
strategy in civil litigation, has engaged in independently wrongful acts 
that are set forth in counterclaims.44 The decision-maker, now an ac-
tor in the drama, must vindicate goodness by identifying and re-
warding the "good" party and condemning and punishing the "bad" 
party.45 Each side struggles to generate intense emotional responses 
Family Law, 60 UNIV. Prrr. L. REV. 1111, 1154 (1999) (describing how divorce in the "fault 
era" involved rampant "collusion and perjury"). Of course, even these areas are, in many 
respects, hardly purely "no fault." HEYMANN & LIEBMAN, supra note 41, at 313; Murphy, 
supra note 41, at 1154-1203 (describing the "new moral discourse" of family law). 
43 A powerful psychological force - usually called the "prime" or "fundamental attribu-
tion error" - is also at work here. This tendency encourages people "to attribute their own 
actions to situational factors ... and the actions of others to stable personality traits." Paul 
Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 526, 548 
(1994); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings, in 10 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 174, 184 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977). See also 
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 39 ("[hJumans seem to find it easy and natural 
to categorize people's actions as intentional; they have much more difficulty seeing peo-
ple's behaviors as, say, circumstantially or structurally determined"). What makes this "er-
ror" particularly troubling is social science research demonstrating that traits associated 
with good morals - such as honesty - are acutely sensitive to context. For example, in a 
pioneering series of studies, Hugh Hartshorne and M.A. May found that while many 
schoolchildren cheat on school exams when given the opportunity to do so, there was not a 
group of "cheaters" who consistently cheated; rather, some students cheated under certain 
circumstances (for example, depending on what was being tested or where the test was 
administered) while others cheated under other circumstances. Hugh Hartshorne & Mark 
May, Studies in the Organization o/Character, READINGS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 190 (H. 
Munisinger ed., 1971). 
44 See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . .. , 15 L. & Soc. REV. 631, 641 
(1980-1981) ("litigation ... may intensify the disputant's moral judgment and focus 
blame"). Criminal practice contains its own version of fighting morality with morality: 
while the essence of prosecution (and of the criminal law generally) is invariably that the 
accused is immoral, a standard defense is that prosecutors and/or law enforcement are 
corrupt, engaging in a cover-up, incompetent, overreaching, etc. My point here is not 
whether such stories are true or not, but that the adversarial system by its nature generates 
this mode of discourse. 
45 Such a contest reflects deeply held cultural norms that create a binary universe: there 
is "us" - the good - and "the other" - the bad, with the distinction being framed in relig-
ious or moral terms. Such a story "draws the battle lines between 'the sons of light' and 
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on the part of our decision-maker/hero so that the hero will do the 
right thing: empathy for the victim and outrage, anger, resentment at 
the moral failings of the wrongdoer.46 
Given these qualities, the story of litigation assumes the fervor of 
a religious crusade. The "zealousness" so often extolled in litigation 
tends to create a binary moral universe in which one's client has moral 
integrity and the opposing party does not. Indeed, it is no accident 
that the word "zealous" itself arose in a religious context.47 Interest-
ingly, the judge - the presiding authority empowered to vindicate mo-
rality - in many ways acts as a kind of divinity, or at least a 
representative of a divine-like higher power, meting out judgments in 
accordance with a moral ledger. There is linguistic evidence for this -
particularly the "prayer for relief" that concludes a complaint in civil 
litigation - but it also manifests itself physically: the priest-like robes 
worn by judges, the elevated bench set off from the earthly world be-
low. There is also something otherworldly in the studied detachment 
that is the conventional sine qua non of effective judging.48 
Finally, the vindications of morality issued by judges - and the 
stories they tell about them - reflect the moral foundation of law. In 
Amsterdam and Bruner's phrase, stories in adjudication "relate the 
Grand and Timeless Principles of a corpus juris to the current particu-
larities of ... cases."49 In other words, stories in litigation carry far 
more freight than just sorting parties into good and bad; their telling 
reaffirms and instantiates "law" in concrete particulars, thereby vindi-
cating the culturally defined norms represented by "law." Indeed, the 
very grandness and timelessness of "law" means that it can only mani-
fest itself in particulars.50 These stories are thus the only way we have 
the 'sons of darkness.'" AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 83-84, quoting ELAINE 
PAGELS, THE ORIGIN OF SATAN 105 (1995). 
46 An interesting tension exists in this aspect of Efforts in litigation. It should come as 
no surprise that "[t]he experiences that lead people to litigate are often highly emotional." 
Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and 
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 
269,303 (1999). While clients may be frustrated at their inability to "vent" these emotions, 
effective advocacy often involves eliciting such emotions on the part of the decision-maker. 
At the same time, it is at the core of our conception of "law" that it has nothing to do with 
emotion, and everything to do with the rational application of legal principles to facts. This 
disconnect raises important inconsistencies between how adjudication actually works -
usually through a carefully calibrated appeal to emotion - and how we say it should work -
a "blind," rational application of facts to law. 
47 See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICfIONARY 1370 (1988) (the "zealots" 
were "a fanatical sect arising in Judea during the first century A.D."). The word retains its 
religious overtones through the phrase a "religious zealot." 
48 Rubinson, supra note 36, at 31. 
49 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 141. 
50 This notion plays out in many standard principles of adjudication and jurisprudence, 
from the requirement that jurisdiction be limited to an actual "case" or "controversy" (see 
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to get at what "law" is - a process that strongly evokes the descrip-
tions of divine happenings on earth so central to religious scripture. 
Litigation therefore presupposes that a corrupted moral agent 
has disrupted an ordered, moral universe. The decision-maker/hero 
must intervene to right these wrongs. Such a meta-narrative pro-
foundly influences the stories told in litigation. It determines where a 
story begins and ends, identifies which facts are relevant in a general 
and evidentiary sense, suggests what remedies are appropriate or in-
appropriate, and generates particular emotional responses on the part 
of the parties and on the part of decision-makers. 
In the end, litigation is about who is good and who is not and 
what to do about it. This moral vision is the foundation of what a case 
is in litigation. 
IV. THE STORY OF MEDIATION 
The story of litigation has been so thoroughly internalized by liti-
gants, judges, and lawyers alike that it operates below the level of con-
sciousness. That is why it has not been necessary to describe what 
litigation is; everybody - lawyers and non-lawyers alike - knows what 
it is. The purpose of the preceding discussion, therefore, was to ex-
amine a process that is usually taken for granted in an unfamiliar way 
- an attempt to, in other words, make the familiar strange.51 
In contrast, for a culture steeped in litigation, the risk in ap-
proaching mediation is in underestimating its strangeness. In its more 
sophisticated forms, mediation is bizarre indeed: it proceeds from fun-
damentally different premises as to what resolving disputes is about 
and, even more fundamentally, as to what a dispute is. Or, to put it in 
terms of my analysis thus far, it tells a different story. 
Before getting to this story, however, mediation's relative unfa-
miliarity warrants some discussion of what it is and the contexts in 
which it is practiced. 
A. The Basics of Mediation 
The very success of mediation has spawned a growing diversity of 
proceedings that carry that label. This is an interesting trend in and of 
itself. Given how the adversary system often acts, as Carrie Menkel-
Meadow has put it, "like a great whale" that "seems to swallow up any 
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case" or "Contro-
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979)) to the unfolding of the "common law" 
through the adjudication of specific cases. 
51 The significance of "making the familiar strange" is an important theme in AMSTER-
DAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 4, and a goal to which I will return in discussing counsel-
ing clients about mediation. See infra text accompanying notes 143-69. 
Spring 2004) Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives 847 
effort to modify or transform it, "52 "Mediation" is sometimes seen as 
a subspecies of litigation - glorified settlement conferences in which a 
"mediator" will advise parties what a case is "worth" or what a "fair" 
resolution would be.53 Moreover, legislation has attempted to "man-
date" mediation54 or empower a mediator to "recommend" a proper 
resolution to a judge,55 both of which are fundamentally inconsistent 
with the essence of mediation. 56 Depending on the particulars (and 
this is no modest caveat - particulars can indeed be crucial), such 
forms can blend into - or at least towards - a more adversarial 
process. 
Moreover, mediation is practiced in a dizzying variety of contro-
versies - divorce, disputes between or within business organizations,57 
community disputes,58 disputes concerning the environment,59 con-
flicts between students at schools,60 criminal matters (usually called 
"victim-offender mediation"),61 international disputes,62 virtually any 
52 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 40 (1996). 
53 See infra text accompanying note 65. 
54 See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 1991 YALE 
L. J. 1545, 1547 (1991) (collecting authorities). Some have argued that these provisions are 
advisable and consistent with the principles of mediation so long as they mandate only the 
process of mediation, not a particular result, while others argue that "mandated media-
tion" is an oxymoron in that a foundation of mediation is that it be a voluntary process. Id. 
at 1581-1585. For a discussion of the voluntariness of mediation, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 72-75. 
55 A primary example is California, which enables local jurisdictions to permit 
mediators to "submit a recommendation to the court as to the custody of or visitation with 
a child." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3183(a). Such provisions have generated substantial criti-
cism. See Grillo, supra note 54, at 1588. 
56 See infra text accompanying notes 82, 92-110. 
57 See CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CON-
FLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE To CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY OR-
GANIZATIONS (1996) (detailing the uses of ADR and mediation for conflicts within 
organizations). 
58 See, e.g, THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY 
MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neil Milner eds., 1995); Cobb & 
Rifkin, supra note 39. 
59 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. 
L. REV. 1 (1981). 
60 William S. Haft & Elaine R. Weiss, Peer Mediation in Schools: Expectations and 
Evaluations, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213 (1998); Kelly Rozmus, Peer Mediation Programs 
in Schools: Resolving Classroom Conflict But Raising Ethical Concerns?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 
69 (1997). 
61 Mark William Bakker, Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Media-
tion in the Criminal Justice System, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1994); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 
1247 (1994). 
62 Judd Epstein, The Use of Comparative Law in Commercial International Arbitration 
and Commercial Mediation, 75 TuL. L. REV. 913 (2001). 
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dispute that is or could be the subject of a lawsuit63 - that discussions 
of mediation often assume that "mediation" happens to have the char-
acteristics of the form of mediation with which the people doing the 
discussing are familiar.64 Scholars themselves are also hardly uniform 
in their views: even within the last decade, debates have erupted over 
the efficacy of newly categorized "models" of or "approaches" to me-
diation, such as "facilitative" versus "evaluative" mediation65 and 
63 For a review of the preceding and other applications of mediation, see KIMBERLEE 
K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 339-357 (2d ed. 2000). 
64 For example, the subject matter area that has generated the most debate about the 
appropriateness of mediation - family law - is in many respects unique in its aggregation of 
intense emotional, political, and social stakes for participants. Other types of frequently 
mediated disputes may present a very different set of circumstances, and the resulting me-
diation can therefore be quite different. Nevertheless, critiques of mediation grounded in 
the particular circumstances at play in family law disputes are extended more generally to 
mediation as a whole. See generally Grillo, supra note 54. 
65 Leonard Riskin first articulated this distinction. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding 
Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 
111 (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). As its name 
implies, "facilitative" mediation focuses exclusively on facilitating communication between 
the parties. Facilitative mediators do not independently suggest solutions, offer no assess-
ment of the strength of a parties' positions or "case," and do not predict what will happen 
if parties fail to reach a mediated settlement. In contrast, an evaluative mediator may 
suggest and argue in favor of certain solutions, may assess the strength of a parties' legal or 
non-legal position, and may predict what will happen if parties do not reach a mediated 
settlement. It should be noted that the spectrum of control manifested by mediators is 
sometimes expressed under different nomenclature in the literature. See, e.g., Edwin H. 
Greenebaum, On Teaching Mediation, 1999 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 130 (arguing that 
mediators "control the substance and process of parties' negotiations" across a spectrum 
"from facilitator, to consultant, to advisor, to guardian"). Moreover, Riskin himself has 
recently offered revisions to his enormously influential categories. Leonard L. Riskin, 
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79 No· 
TRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 (2003) (proposing the substitution of the terms "directive" and 
"elicitive" for "evaluative" and "facilitative"). 
In any event, categorizing mediators as "facilitative" or "evaluative" has generated 
extensive academic debates about which approach is best. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute 
Professionals, 44 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 1871, 1887 (1997); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Ver-
sus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 985 
(1997). Other commentators argue (in my view accurately) that the distinction has been 
overblown and that virtually all mediations likely contain elements of both approaches, 
albeit with different degrees of emphasis. See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, 
Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solv-
ing Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235,276-280 (2002) (arguing that all mediations 
contains explicit or implicit "evaluation" by the mediator). That said, an extreme "evalua-
tive approach" does tend to adopt the norms of the adversary system, which, in turn, ren-
ders this approach largely if not fully consistent with how the adversary system shapes and 
resolves conflict. Not surprisingly, "evaluative mediation" resonates well with conven-
tional modes of lawyering and, as a result, lawyers tend to choose and prefer an evaluative 
approach on the part of mediators. J. Brad Reich, Attorney v. Client: Creating a Mecha-
nism to Address Competing Process Interests in Lawyer-Driven Mediation, 26 S. ILL. U.L.J. 
183, 188-192 (2002). In contrast, what is called "facilitative mediation" tends to create 
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"transformative" versus "transactional" mediation.66 Moreover, given 
the flexibility and openness inherent in the mediation process, the 
tone and flavor of mediation is particularly subject to the personality, 
skills, philosophy, and sophistication of a particular mediator. Indeed, 
depending on the jurisdiction and the type of mediation, a given medi-
ator mayor may not be a lawyer67 or may not even have any special-
ized training in mediation at al1.68 
Even with this diversity of opinion about mediation,69 there re-
mains a measure of consensus among commentators at least about 
what mediation should be, particularly at the narrative level at which I 
wish to approach it. A leading mediation text offers a representative 
- albeit not a particularly evocative - example: 
[M]ediation is generally defined as the intervention in a negotiation 
or a conflict of an acceptable third party who has limited or no au-
thoritative decision-making power but who assists the involved par-
ties in voluntarily reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of 
different narratives and different disputes. To the extent these categories represent mean-
ingful distinctions, my references to mediation assume a "facilitative" approach. 
66 See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994). Propo-
nents of "transformative mediation" argue that mediation has classically been concerned 
with the resolution of a particular conflict or "transaction." This focus on "settlement" - a 
vestige of adjudication - constrains what mediation can achieve. The goal of transforma-
tive mediation is both different and more ambitious: instead of focusing on settling a par-
ticular dispute, transformative mediation seeks to transform the quality of future 
interactions among the parties themselves. Thus, "[s]uccess is measured, in transformative 
mediation, not by settlement but by party shifts toward strength, responsiveness and con-
structive interaction." Robert A. Baruch Bush, Handling Workplace Conflict: Why Trans-
formative Mediation?, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 369-70 (2001). Put another way, 
transformative mediation uses specific disputes as a means to engender broader change in 
how the parties interact. 
67 Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 254-56 . As lawyers have become increasingly in-
volved in mediation, the issue of whether mediators need to be lawyers has generated 
"[t]ensions between legal and non-legal professionals who practice mediation." Jd. at 256. 
68 This diversity of qualifications exists even in the jurisdictions that mandate divorce 
mediation. See Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the 
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Media-
tion, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317,1396-97 (1995) (collecting "mediator qualifications" in "juris-
dictions with regulated mandatory mediation"). Nevertheless, the continuing growth of 
mediation has led more states to require some measure of certification for mediators. No-
lan-Haley, supra note 65, at 244 n.34 (collecting recent efforts to require licensing of 
mediators). 
69 The same diversity also applies to litigation. Litigation itself is extraordinarily di-
verse, ranging from a criminal jury trial (a sort of baseline paradigm of "zealous advo-
cacy") to commercial litigation, matters primarily involving poor defendants (iandlord-
tenant and consumer debt collection matters in particular) that are usually litigated in sep-
arate "high volume" fora, administrative proceedings of numerous varieties, etc. This fun-
damental diversity is only rarely recognized in descriptions of the adversary system. For an 
exception, see Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of 
Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992). 
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issues in dispute. In addition to addressing substantive issues, medi-
ation may also establish or strengthen relationships of trust and re-
spect between parties or terminate relationships in a manner that 
minimizes costs and psychological harm'?o 
A more succinct definition, found widely in the literature, is that me-
diation is "facilitated negotiation. "71 
Neither definition expresses how radically different mediation 
can be from litigation. Rather than attempt some sort of systematic 
point by point procedural comparison - a futile exercise given that the 
two processes do not have parallel points to compare - I will attempt 
to dig deeper by describing six conceptual differences between litiga-
tion and mediation. 
1. Actors and Owners 
Once litigation is commenced, parties are actors compelled by 
force of law to act within a system: this is most obvious in criminal 
cases, where criminal defendants obviously cannot unilaterally "opt 
out" of a case, but it is also true in civil litigation, where one party can 
compel the participation of another party or risk entry of a default 
judgment. Moreover, all litigation operates in the shadow of a simple 
fact: a court can impose its judgments by force on parties - a force 
that Robert Cover famously characterized as a state-sponsored resort 
to "violence. "72 
In contrast, mediation is a voluntary process.?3 While this picture 
has been clouded by the rise of "court-referred" and "court-ordered" 
mediation and enforceable "agreements to mediate,"74 a preeminent-
if not the greatest - value in mediation is "the principle of self-deter-
mination"75 through which parties "own" the process. The ultimate 
way to "own" a process is to have power to decide whether to engage 
70 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 15 (2d ed. 1998). 
71 See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 63, at 23. 
72 Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986). As Cover put 
it, "[Ilegal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death ... A judge articulates her 
understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his 
children, even his life." Id. 
73 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 24. 
74 There are inevitable tensions when the adversary system - with its discourse of or-
ders and compulsions - starts to "refer matters to" and "enforce" a "voluntary" process 
like mediation. For an excellent overview of these tensions, see James J. Alfini & Cathe-
rine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case 
Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171 (2001). See also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? 
The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 
1199 (2000) (examining the tension between courts and litigants who wish a court to vali-
date non-judicial forms of dispute resolution). 
75 Joint Code for Mediators, I, reprinted in KOVACH, supra note 63, at 376. 
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in it or not. Put another way, mediation must sell itself to parties be-
cause the parties can walk away without buying. 
2. Perspectives 
As I have already described, litigation is consumed with deter-
mining "what happened" in order to determine liabilityJ6 Judges and 
juries decide "what happened" and sort liability (or penalties) 
accordingly. 
In contrast, mediation rejects the idea that "what happened" is a 
unitary or stable "truth" to be found "out there." Instead, a primary -
if not the primary - thrust of mediation is that conflict resolution en-
tails some recognition on the part of disputants that "what happened" 
is informed by perspective. Literature on mediation is rife with this 
idea: a critical component of mediation is that parties "begin to ac-
knowledge another view of the situation,"77 or "[t]he challenge for 
mediation is to somehow lead people to a situation where they can, at 
the very least, allow two contending perceptions to coexist,"78 or to 
"enable each person to see the other as the victim, and in the process, 
build a new moral framework."79 This is, of course, no easy task for 
almost by definition, parties to a dispute "hear completely different 
music and have no appreciation for another view."80 
To encourage parties to move beyond their perspective, some 
mediators ask parties to "restate the opposing view" as a means to 
promote their understanding of the other side's perspective.8! This 
alone highlights the utterly different dispute resolution universe in-
habited by mediation: it is impossible to imagine such a mechanism 
having any meaning - let alone usefulness - in the context of 
litigation. 
3. Rights and Wrongs in Mediation 
Given the importance of "perspective" in mediation, the very no-
tion of "judgment" is alien to mediation, as are notions of "fault" and 
even "responsibility." Issuing "judgments" (both in its legal and non-
76 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
77 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 140. 
78 Alan C. Tidwell, Not Effective Communication but Effective Persuasion, 12 MEDIA-
TION Q. 4, 5 (1995). For an especially vivid demonstration of how a skilled mediator can 
accomplish this, see Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward A Second-Generation Dis-
pute Resolution Practice, 28 FORDHAM L.J. 1017, 1024-1027 (2001). 
79 Cobb, supra note 78, at 103l. 
80 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 160. 
81 [d. An affirmative restating of another perspective - sometimes called "considering 
the opposite" in the literature of social psychology - has been shown to assist people in 
recognizing the validity of alternative perspectives. See Rubinson, supra note 36, at 32-34 
(1996). I discuss this technique at greater length infra text accompanying notes 162-69. 
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legal sense) and finding "fault" or "responsibility" impede mediation 
because mediators want parties to be the authors of their own media-
tion. A morality tale which identifies one party as "moral" necessarily 
brands the other party as not, and the "immoral" party is not likely to 
"own" a process that produces such a result.82 
4. "Time" in Mediation 
Litigation looks backward in time: it seeks to resolve disputes 
through historical reconstruction of past events. In contrast, media-
tion focuses on what needs to be done to resolve disputes in light of 
present and future interests.83 This is not to say that history - or at 
least perspectives on history - does not have its place in mediation: 
indeed, history in mediation might offer clues about how to resolve 
controversy in the here and now, or parties might require validation of 
their perspective on history - and the catharsis that describing that 
history might bring - as necessary before meaningful progress can be 
made towards resolving controversy.84 Nevertheless, the past in medi-
ation is typically not the foundation for resolving conflict.85 
Put another way, the present moment embodies the lifeblood of 
mediation because the here and now contains the different needs that 
people have and the ways that these needs can be satisfied by comple-
82 As one commentator notes, an "impediment to problem solving is the reluctance of 
the parties to share responsibility for a dispute, let alone its resolution. The most common 
reaction is an attempt to allocate blame. The mediator must get the parties to recognize 
that mediation is a problem solving process which uses collaboration, and that each person 
must share the responsibility for the process." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 163. Or, to put 
this in more narrative terms, a morality tale necessarily closes off other tales in which 
moral roles are reversed or the "morality" is subject to perspective. See Cobb & Rifkin, 
supra note 39, at 72 (a story "is effective as a story because it closes off the possibility of 
multiple interpretations") (emphasis in original); AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, 
at 133 ("certain narratives drive to certain endings and not others"). 
83 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 71 ("[t]he mediators interest in the story is not in 
the past but in the present and the future; thus the story is an instrument through which 
mediators may shift attention from retrospective positions and accounts to prospective sto-
ries, effectively disconnecting the problem from its history, from its roots"). 
84 Dealing forthrightly and constructively with a party's emotions in light of the history 
of a dispute is viewed as a fundamental skill that successful mediators should have. See, 
e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at 162-69; KOVACH, supra note 63, at 48-49. Indeed, an unre-
flective focus only on the future might lead mediators to discount the past or, worse, view it 
as "irrelevant" with extraordinarily damaging results to parties for whom the past provides 
context and meaning. Grillo, supra note 54, at 1563-64. 
85 It is interesting to note how this aspect of mediation plays out in debates about the 
efficacy of the adversary system. One strain in the critical literature on the adversary sys-
tem doubts the ability of adversarial proceedings to "ascertain truth." See, e.g., I.P. CALLI. 
SON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE 569-71 (1956) (arguing against proposition that "our 
contentious system has great merit as a means of getting at the truth"). Mediation, how-
ever, sidesteps this issue and rather implicitly questions whether it is necessary (or possi-
ble) to get at "truth" in order to resolve disputes. 
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menting - or at least not impinging - on the needs of others.86 People 
might want services, goods, apologies, jobs, arrangements among the 
parties or among others, an opportunity to "tell my side of the story." 
Mediation seeks to accommodate what people want or need now to 
resolve a controversy. 
5. Narrowing and Expanding 
Litigation seeks to "narrow issues" - and thereby the contested 
narrative - through a panoply of procedural and substantive mecha-
nisms: responsive pleadings, motions to dismiss, pretrial orders, the 
requirement of relevance.87 Indeed, a critical quality of legal rules 
themselves is to narrow which "facts" have meaning in the contest and 
which do not. Legal rules identify which circumstances are relevant 
and establish temporal frames to define wrongdoing: a tort, a breach 
of contract, a crime - all delineate what and when factual circum-
stances are meaningful to the resolution of controversy in litigation.88 
In contrast, rather than narrowing issues, the mediation process 
tends to embrace openness in dialogue. Such openness encourages 
parties to discuss and disclose anything that would facilitate the reso-
lution of controversy. The idea is that the more circumstances and 
possibilities are shared by the parties to mediation, the greater the 
chances that the parties, with the assistance of the mediator, can find 
creative ways to resolve disputes.89 
6. Ex Parte in Spades: The "Private Caucus" 
Judges are prohibited in most instances in from engaging in ex 
parte communications.90 This is a function of the ostensible "neutral-
86 This is related to the idea underlying "non-zero sum" solutions and the distinction 
between "positions" and "interests" that are a major component in literature on negotia-
tion. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 U.c.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM 
URY, GETIING To YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 40-55 (2d ed. 
1991). 
87 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued persuasively that this narrowing process begins 
even as lawyers fit client stories into legal categories prior to the commencement of litiga-
tion. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes By Lawyers: What the Dis-
pute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 31-34 (1985). 
88 Robert Rubinson, Attorney Fact-Finding, Ethical Decision-Making and the Method-
ology of Law, 45 ST. LoUIS UNIV. L.J. 1185, 1217-1218 (2001). 
89 This aspect of mediation resonates with literature on problem solving generally, 
which holds that problem solvers are most effective when they generate as many plausible 
solutions to a problem as possible before evaluating the effectiveness of each. See, e.g., 
Greenebaum, supra note 65, at 123. 
90 See ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(7) ("A judge shall not initiate, permit, 
or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding"). 
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ity" and "detachment" of judges: since judges have to determine facts, 
rights, and liabilities, they must be protected from the persuasive 
power of a lone advocate not subject to a response. 
In contrast, what in litigation is called "ex parte communications" 
is an integral and accepted part of mediation. The term of art for 
these types of communications is "private caucus." Private caucuses 
enable mediators to meet in private with one party, and thus without 
the impediment of the other side chilling the communication.91 Given 
that the job of the mediator is to facilitate parties in resolving their 
disputes, these caucuses can be extraordinarily useful, for, among 
other reasons, the telling of a story in the presence of a party who is 
predisposed to debate virtually every point of it inhibits the teller 
from being more open about doubts and possible ways to resolve a 
dispute. 
B. The Non-Story of Mediation 
Despite the profound differences between how judges and 
mediators go about resolving disputes, parties to mediation often ap-
proach mediation with morality tales in hand. As two commentators 
on mediation have put it, "all parties struggle to describe themselves 
as victims; according to the logic of their stories, they are not responsi-
ble for the set of events that leads to the problem or conflict."92 As in 
litigation, each party holds the other party morally culpable and re-
sponsible for harm, and thus justice and morality require that the 
wrongdoer be held to account. 
Nevertheless, while the competing narratives that litigants and 
parties to mediation carry around in their heads prior to entering each 
process are similar and sometimes identical, litigation and mediation 
fundamentally diverge in what they do with them. Litigation, as we 
have seen, confirms and intensifies the good versus evil contours of 
litigants' stories, with decision-makers in litigation invited into the 
story as agents of moral vindication. Mediation is utterly different. 
Parties to mediation might arrive with contradictory versions of 
Steady State to Trouble, hankering for vindication of the moral cor-
ruption of the other party. And then ... nothing happens. Or at least 
nothing happens for a while. Mediators need not and should not 
choose a true Trouble or assume the role of agent of moral vindica-
tion. The existence of multiple versions of "what happened" in medi-
ation - with the inconsistent moral "truths" implied by such a 
91 For a discussion of the uses of the private caucus in the context of mediation, see 
MOORE, supra note 70, at 319-26; KOVACH, supra note 63, at 164-65. 
92 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 75 (emphasis in original); WINSLADE & MONK, 
supra note 20, at 7. 
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divergence - does not generate the anxiety for story completion so 
characteristic of litigation. 
In narrative terms, then, mediation at this level has no story, or at 
least no great need to generate a story. Mediators are not anxious to 
"find" the "truth" of what happened, but approach dueling narratives 
with an understanding that dueling narratives are, by definition, what 
constitute conflict before mediation seeks to resolve it. While parties 
might - and often do - expend great Efforts to convince the mediator 
that they are right, mediators hope to defuse those Efforts in order to 
encourage parties to focus their attention elsewhere. 
Mediators decline the role of hero in another sense as well. A 
mediator's "power," at least among more sophisticated mediators, de-
rives pragmatically from results and movement generated by the me-
diation itself. The mediator herself mayor may not be responsible for 
this: if parties are moving towards resolution through some process 
and dialogue of their own devising with minimal or no intervention on 
the part of the mediator, then this is a fine mediation indeed.93 
So what does a mediator do? The mediator proceeds in whatever 
fashion works to facilitate a resolution of the parties' dispute. 
"Whatever works" includes an array of possible strategies: retelling 
each party's version of the Steady State to Trouble transition in a way 
that is meaningful (and acceptable) to the participants,94 enabling par-
ticipants to see "truth" in different stories about that transition,95 
marginalizing the Trouble and the different stories about it in favor of 
a fresh focus on how participants could construct a new Steady State 
decoupled from the past,96 and so on. None of these are necessarily 
exclusive and may be (and often are) used in combination. 
C. Mediation as a Story of Collaborative Striving To 
Resolve Conflict 
All of this is not to say that mediation does not embody what I 
have previously called a "meta-narrative" with elements described by 
the Austere Definition of Narrative. It does. Not surprisingly, this 
93 This is not to say that a multitude of complications may not come into play, such as 
instances where there is a power differential among the parties or where one party is "hid-
ing" information from the other party. Some of these complications relate to when media-
tion is appropriate, and some relate the role attorneys play in the mediation process. See 
infra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
94 Cobb & Rifkin, supra note 39, at 86 (1991) (describing how mediators can "[w]eave 
two narratives together to construct positive discursive positions for all disputants"). For 
an approach to mediation that explicitly draws upon the possibilities of deconstructing and 
the reconstructing disputants' narratives, see generally WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20. 
95 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
856 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:833 
narrative profoundly differs from that of litigation. The engine that 
drives litigation's morality tale is that conflict resolution is a contest 
between parties, one of whom necessarily represents good and the 
other necessarily represents bad.97 As a result, litigation seeks to des-
ignate who has committed moral transgressions by breaching legal 
norms (or, from the perspective of the defendant, who wrongfully ac-
cuses others of having done SO).98 
The Story of Mediation subverts these norms by transforming this 
familiar morality tale into a story of collaboration. This subversion 
begins through how mediation conceives of conflict itself. Implicit in 
the Story of Litigation is that conflict represents a breach of the norms 
of conduct, thereby ripping the social fabric in some way large or 
small.99 In contrast, in mediation, conflict is a norm of conduct, a nec-
essary byproduct of humans having distinct experiences and personali-
ties and needs. Conflict is thus not necessarily a disruption of the 
moral order, and, indeed, can sometimes be productive. lOo 
Mediation's normalization of conflict, however, cannot eliminate 
what appears to be a deep-seated human need to understand experi-
ence in terms of struggles and strivings. Humans have great difficulty 
perceiving events as generated by causes beyond our control - what 
Amsterdam and Bruner evocatively describe as an inability to see 
events as "One Damn Thing After Another."101 We must instead 
"shape them into strivings and adversities, contests and rewards, van-
quishings and setbacks."102 The meta-narrative of litigation maps 
these "strivings" and "vanquishings" onto the struggle of one party 
against another and enlists the aid of the court to vindicate justice on 
behalf of the wronged party. In contrast, the meta-narrative of media-
tion seeks to map these "strivings" and "vanquishings" onto a collabo-
rative struggle to resolve conflict. This narrative casts all participants 
as players in a process - collaboration - that is focused on reaching 
the common goal of successfully resolving or transforming a dis-
pute.1°3 This story has moral entailments because collaboration is ac-
97 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 39. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 42-46. 
99 See supra text accompanying note 34. 
100 One leading commentator, for example, notes that "conflict can be an exciting and 
inspiring experience." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 3. A substantial literature on conflict 
resolution at the organizational level tends to view conflict as an inevitable byproduct of 
human interactions that must be dealt systematically and forthrightly. See, e.g., CATHY A. 
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS: A GUIDE To CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1996) 
("conflict is an organizational fact of life, neither good nor bad"). 
101 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 31. 
102 [d. 
103 This difference in stories can also be framed purposively. The goal of litigation is to 
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cepted as a social and moral good. Unlike litigation, however, this 
story does not generate a binary moral universe that divides the good 
from the bad, but, rather, a universe that values collaborative striving 
to achieve common ground and resolution. 
This story places mediators in a role that is very different from 
the role played by decision-makers in litigation. Rather than being 
heroes of moral vindication to whom wronged parties appeal for jus-
tice, mediators promote and model collaborative striving to overcome 
conflict. This plays out in many accepted techniques in mediation. 
Mediators, for example, often seek "commitment" from participants 
to the process of mediation, although mediators are careful not to ex-
tend this commitment to a commitment to agree.104 This commitment 
to process is a proxy for a commitment to collaborate to seek to re-
solve conflict, thus incrementally moving participants away from con-
tested litigation and towards collaborative problem solving. Similarly, 
mediators often "reframe" participants' statements in order to empha-
size "common ground. "105 This is also an effort to move parties away 
from a morally charged contest and into collaboration. Finally, 
mediators encourage and model collaboration through a positive mes-
sage of optimism and progress towards resolution, even when (or, per-
haps, especially when) impasse appears likely.106 
Moreover, mediation approaches the narrative movement from 
Efforts to Restoration of Steady State in a very different way than liti-
gation.107 Whether the Steady State is Restored or Transformed con-
stitutes what I have earlier characterized as a "fork in the road" in the 
Austere Definition of Narrative.108 The very language through which 
litigants seek redress of grievances - to "be made whole," "to pay 
your debt society" (with its implication that payment of the debt 
would return the ledger to balance), even the word "remedy" - im-
plies Restoration. In contrast, mediation tends to reject Restoration as 
a state to which the parties (and society as whole) should or even can 
return. Rather, mediation seeks Transformation on the part of all dis-
putants so that conflict is resolved.109 It does so by embracing the 
win, and that means defeating the other party. The goal of mediation is to resolve con-
flicts, and that means overcoming whatever impediments there are to achieving resolution. 
104 See, e.g., KOVACH, supra note 63, at 85; Tidwell, supra note 78, at 11. 
105 See, Tidwell, supra note 78, at 11-12. 
106 Kimberlee Kovach, for example, suggests that mediators do the following when me-
diation faces impasse: "Use words of encouragement. If any progress at all has been made, 
acknowledge and positively reinforce it. This can go a long way in motivating further 
movement." KOVACH, supra note 63, at 166 
107 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46. 
108 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
109 This aspect of mediation goes back to Lon Fuller - a central and early scholar of 
mediation - who noted that "the central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient 
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notion that perceptions of the world (including perceptions of the ac-
tions of others) are unstable, thus enabling parties to appreciate alter-
native perspectives as a way to promote resolution of conflict. l1O 
Mediation, therefore, does embody a plot that adheres to the narra-
tive movement described by the Austere Definition, albeit in ways 
that are utterly alien to the morality tale of the story of litigation. The 
story of mediation can be characterized as follows: 
Steady State: Whatever Each Party Views as Pre-Conflict 
Trouble: Whatever Each Party Views as Constituting Conflict 
Efforts: Collaborative Striving To Overcome Conflict as Modeled 
and Promoted by Mediator 
Transformation of Steady State: A New Relationship Among Parties 
Coda: Moving On 
V. CLIENT COUNSELING AND CONFLICT 
So litigation and mediation create distinctive factual and moral 
worlds, and these worlds can be described narratively. What does this 
mean for lawyers practicing in the field? If, as I have described, the 
Story of Litigation and the Story of Mediation create different worlds, 
"explaining" mediation in a meaningful way is a profound challenge 
that requires subtlety and creativity. Lawyers and legal educators, as 
practitioners and teachers of client counseling, should confront the 
challenge head on. Approaching litigation and mediation in narrative 
terms offers great promise in meeting this challenge. However, it also 
poses challenges to more traditional conceptions of the role of lawyers 
in mediation and in counseling clients about mediation. 
A. Lawyers and Mediation 
Practitioners of mediation have historically had an uneasy rela-
tionship with the practicing bar. Many view lawyers as conflict-inten-
the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to 
achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect 
their attitudes and dispositions toward one another." Lon Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms 
and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971). See also WINS LADE & MONK, supra 
note 20, at 26 (describing stance of mediator as "coauthor" in helping disputants reconsti-
tute their dispute). 
My use of the term "Transformation" should not be confused with the specific ap-
proach to mediation called "transformative mediation." See supra note 66. That said, the 
narrative understanding of "Transformation" is largely consistent with "transformative me-
diation," although theorists and practitioners of transformative mediation hold that media-
tion should focus not on resolution of a particular conflict, but transformation of parties' 
interactions with each other. Id. 
110 This post-modern note in mediation theory and practice has become more explicit in 
recent years. See, e.g., WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 3. 
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sifiers due to training, temperament, and financial self-interest. lll 
Indeed, the very rise of mediation may in part be attributable to its 
promise of moving lawyers to the margins and offering parties a direct 
voice in resolving their own controversies. As a result, lawyers are 
viewed in some quarters as at best necessary evils in mediation.u2 
Some state statutes go further and empower mediators to ban lawyers 
from mediation sessions.113 Moreover, to the extent lawyers in recent 
years increasingly participate in mediation,114 the type of mediation 
favored or assumed to be "mediation" by lawyers - so-called "evalua-
tive mediation"115 - tends to strip mediation of its more distinctive 
characteristics. What often remains is something very familiar: an ad-
versarial hearing that adheres to the story of litigation and that, while 
perhaps resolving conflict, does not differ in a meaningful way from 
litigation.116 
Even so, growing numbers of commentators both in and out of 
the world of mediation view lawyers as potentially constructive forces 
for promoting the resolution of conflict. Robert J. Gilson and Robert 
H. Mnookin, for example, drawing on game theory, see a corps of 
attorneys who adopt a "cooperative" stance as having "the potential 
for damping rather than exacerbating the conflictual character of liti-
gation."l17 In a different but related vein, Carrie Menkel-Meadow 
111 For a discussion of many lawyers' ignorance or antipathy towards mediation due to 
"how lawyers look at the world, the economics and structure of contemporary law practice, 
and the lack of training in mediation," see Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 57-59 (1982). See also Sternlight, supra note 46, at 315 (describing how 
lawyers' "economic incentives" and "psychological makeups" may inhibit a negotiated or 
mediated settlement). 
112 See KOVACH, supra note 63, at 98-99; Sternlight, supra note 46, at 269 ("[m]any 
believe that lawyers' adversarial methods and mind sets are inherently inconsistent with 
mediation"). 
113 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4351.5(e) (2002) ("[t]he mediator shall have the author-
ity to exclude counsel from participation in the mediation proceedings where, in the discre-
tion of the mediator, exclusion of counsel is deemed by the mediator to be appropriate or 
necessary"). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(a)(6) (providing that only parties may 
attend certain family mediation sessions). 
114 See Sternlight, supra note 46, at 277-278 (citing statistics about and describing how 
attorneys "are ... accompanying their clients to many mediations"). 
115 See supra text accompanying note 65. 
116 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 252 (discussing how lawyer's involvement in me-
diation "has given rise to charges that they are making ADR more adversarial and legalis-
tic"). Some evidence suggests that this is so because lawyers tend to assume that "they 
'know it all' about mediation" without the necessary background and training - an assump-
tion that leads these lawyers to adopt a conventional adversarial stance within the media-
tion process. See Susan w. Harrell, Why Lawyers Attend Mediation Sessions, 12 
MEDIATION Q. 369, 372 (1995). 
117 Robert J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing through Agents: Cooperation and 
Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 510-12 (1994). Gilson and 
Mnookin, citing the matrimonial bar in San Francisco, argue that this is in fact the case in 
some contexts. ld. 
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and others hope to replace the prevailing lawyer-as-zealous-advocate 
paradigm with the notion that effective lawyers are problem solv-
ers. lI8 Lawyers as problem solvers bear little resemblance to tradi-
tional advocates; they perceive "cases" as embodying a set of needs 
and interests that might be resolved (or not) depending on the choice 
of dispute resolution process.119 
Lawyers can indeed playa crucial role in counseling clients about 
and appearing with clients in mediation.120 Lawyers, for example, can 
help neutralize "power imbalances" between parties that mediation 
can recapitulate or exacerbate121 and can protect clients from the sub-
118 See, e.g., Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer as 
Problem-Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as 
Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 
TEMPLE L. REV. 785 (1999); Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 246-249; Paul Brest, The Re-
sponsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1995). Some law school case books also explicitly adopt this per-
spective. See, e.g., LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
AND LAWYERS (2d ed. 1997). 
Another line of critique is framed in terms of how lawyers need to take into account 
the impact that their clients' actions might have on third parties in order to vindicate other 
values. The two preeminent theorists in this line are William H. Simon, who draws upon 
"justice" as a value that sometimes trumps client autonomy, and David Luban, who draws 
upon "common morality" as a key value. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF Jus-
TICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY (1988). See also Rubinson, supra note 88, at 1195-1200 (summarizing and 
contrasting the views of Simon and Luban). A recent colloquium examined these issues in 
detail. Colloquium, What Does It Mean To Practice Law "In the Interests of Justice" in the 
Twenty-First Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543 (2002). 
119 For an excellent summary of problem-solving lawyering and the literature surround-
ing it, see Nolan-Haley, supra note 65, at 247-249. 
120 Despite the obvious significance of such a role for attorneys, it is striking how little 
has been written on this topic. For two thoughtful exceptions, see Sternlight, supra note 46, 
at 275-291(summarizing existing literature on the meaning of advocacy in mediation); 
McEwan, et ai, supra note 68. Moreover, there is even less literature on how attorneys 
should go about counseling clients about the nature of mediation - a primary concern of 
this Article. 
121 The problem of power differentials among parties to mediation has been the subject 
of vigorous debate, particularly when the disadvantaged parties are women or minorities. 
See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 54; Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Ad-
verse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984); 
Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Media-
tion, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177 (1994); Connie J.A. Beck & Bruce D. Sales, A Critical Reappraisal 
of Divorce Mediation Research and Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 989 (2000); Rich-
ard Delgado et aI., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1387-91. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (arguing that in some instances mediation is more suitable for 
"female needs" than litigation). A core problem is that one of the great virtues of media-
tion - its flexibility and lack of external constraints imposed by legal rules or court-im-
posed judgments - can also be its greatest weakness: a recourse to rights and rules has long 
been a path to empowerment, and a process free of such constraints may subtly or not so 
subtly recapitulate the subordination of already subordinated parties. See Grillo, supra 
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tle or not so subtle coercion "bad" mediators can exercise.122 Law-
yers, however, must confront an initial challenge before getting to 
these issues: how can clients even consider or think about mediation 
when the morality tale they have in their heads is something media-
tion hopes to transform? 
B. Dislodging the Litigation Narrative 
Given that litigation and mediation embody different narratives 
and thereby generate different disputes,123 there seems to be a 
straightforward way for lawyers to encourage clients to understand 
and consider a mediation alternative. Lawyers can advise a client 
about how different modes of dispute resolution generate different 
disputes, describe different dispute resolution processes that might be 
available, and present how a dispute might look when filtered through 
the processes of each. 
But it is not that easy. Clients typically come to a lawyer's office 
note 54, at 1557-58; Delgado et aI., supra, at 1391-99; Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 100 
YALE L.J. 1073, 1078 (1984) (arguing how a court-rendered judgment "Iessen[s] the impact 
of distributional inequalities"). Lawyers can diminish this concern by enhancing the ability 
of clients to make meaningful choices about whether to pursue mediation and to equalize 
power in the mediation itself. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 46, at 274 (1999) (while in 
some situations an "attorney should frequently stop herself from dominating the media-
tion," in others "the attorney must be active and assertive to ensure that her client is not 
coerced by the opposing party"); Penelope Eileen Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The 
Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q. 177, 192 (1994) (arguing for strong 
advocacy by lawyers for clients who are likely to be at risk in mediation); Susan W. Har-
rell, Why Attorneys Attend Mediation Sessions, 12 MEDIATION Q. 369, 371 (1995) (some 
Florida lawyers who attended family law mediation described their presence as helping to 
protect clients "from themselves," "from the opposing parties," and "from the opposing 
attorneys"). See also McEwan et. ai, supra note 68, at 1319 (arguing that lawyers have a 
constructive role to play in family mediation). 
122 In a stunning perversion of the collaborative spirit that mediation hopes to foster, 
mediators have coerced parties into entering agreements by labeling them as "uncoopera-
tive" unless they do so. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 54, at 1603 (arguing that mediation that 
"sells itself" as a relational mode of dispute resolution can be "disastrous" when it in fact 
acts coercively); Bryan, supra note 121. While such instances do not mean that we should 
condemn mediation because there are bad mediators just as we do not condemn surgery 
because there are bad surgeons, it is still troubling that bad mediators can cause so much 
damage through a process that is, by definition, largely private, confidential and not subject 
to external review. As a result, a greater understanding on the part of clients about what 
mediation should or can be - an understanding that lawyers in counseling sessions are in a 
wonderful position to promote - may empower clients to recognize bad mediation when 
they see it. For a rare instance when an alleged "bad mediator" was actually subjected to 
judicial scrutiny, albeit unsuccessfully, see Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp.2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) 
(court declined to hear plaintiffs' attempt to repudiate settlement agreement reached in 
mediation; plaintiffs contended that mediator coerced settlement by threatening that they 
"would be responsible for paying all attorneys' fees and costs if [they] did not agree to 
settle and that they would be 'financially ruined' "). 
123 As one commentator has succinctly put it, "[h]ow the dispute is conceived is influ-
enced by how the story is told." Greenebaum, supra note 65, at 121. 
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with litigation narratives in place.124 These narratives run deep. After 
all, it is extraordinarily difficult to deconstruct one's own experience, 
for it seems transparent to us that what we have experienced is what 
is.125 As a result, to most disputants, the binary moral universe of the 
litigation narrative is the universe, with the goods and evils and rights 
and wrongs arrayed as they are. Yet in order to make room for the 
mediation alternative, lawyers must dislodge this narrative, or at least 
encourage clients to consider the possibility of alternatives.126 
One way of understanding how lawyers can do so is to consider 
the fluid nature of conflict. A "dispute" or "controversy" is not a uni-
tary, static "thing," but rather an assemblage of competing stories, 
motivations, and interests. Disputes are dynamic, ever-changing phe-
nomena.127 They undergo transformations: "individuals define and 
redefine their perceptions of experience and the nature of their griev-
ances in response to the communications, behavior, and expectations 
of a range of people, including opponents, agents, authority figures, 
companions, and intimates."128 
As this process unfolds, lawyers inevitably shape disputants' per-
ceptions of a controversy in a multitude of ways,129 including the 
moral dimension of disputes and the attribution of responsibility.13° 
124 See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 7 (describing how disputants prior to 
mediation adhere to an "externalizing, blaming description" of other disputants); J. Brad 
Reich, Attorney v. Client: Creating a Mechanism to Address Competing Process Interests in 
Lawyer-Driven Mediation, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 183, 189-192 (2002) (examining studies dem-
onstrating that clients "rarely" or "never" requested the use of ADR). 
125 As two leading social psychologists have put it, "people fail to recognize the degree 
to which their interpretations of the situation are just that - constructions and inferences 
rather than faithful reflections of some objective and invariant reality." LEE Ross & RICH-
ARD E. NISBElT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECrIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 85 (1991). 
126 In keeping with the stranger than fiction flavor of much modern physics, there is an 
established hypothesis that there really are "multiple universes." See TIMOTHY FERRIS, 
THE WHOLE SHEBANG 260-63 (1998). 
127 See Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transforma-
tion of Disputes, 15 L. & Soc. REv. 775, 776 (1980-1981) ("a dispute is not a static event 
which simply 'happens, but ... the structure of disputes, quarrels, and offenses includes 
changes or transformations over time") (emphasis in original). This conception of "dis-
pute" resonates with ideas usually associated with "social constructivism" about the fluid 
and unstable nature of "reality" in general. See, e.g., WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, 
at 38. 
128 Felstiner, et aI., supra note 44, at 638. 
129 Id. at 641. Felstiner et al. describe how attributing moral responsibility shifts as a 
dispute unfolds over time: "[A]ttibutions themselves are not fixed. As moral coloration is 
modified by new information, logic, insight, or experience, attributions are changed, and 
they alter the participants' understanding of their experience ... Some processes, such as 
counseling, may drain the dispute of moral content and diffuse responsibility for problems: 
others, like direct confrontation or litigation, may intensify the disputant's moral judgment 
and focus blame." Id. 
130 For a scrupulous and detailed description of the complexity of how meaning is made 
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Indeed, attorneys appear at critical junctures in the life of a contro-
versy. In an influential article, William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. 
Abel, and Austin Sarat argue that disputes proceed through a series of 
dynamic stages they call "naming, blaming, and claiming."!31 After an 
"injurious experience" is perceived and "named," the experience may 
be transformed into a grievance - a "blaming" - "when a person at-
tributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity."132 
The grievance may then be transformed into a "claim" when someone 
with a grievance "voices it to the person or entity believed to be re-
sponsible and asks for some remedy."133 The final stage - a transfor-
mation from "claim" to "dispute" - occurs when a claim is explicitly 
or implicitly rejected.134 All of these stages are themselves unstable 
and open to reinterpretation by those who are experiencing them. 
Lawyers usually enter the scene at the "claiming" or "disputing" stage 
just when a disputant is poised (or forced) to turn to a more formal-
ized process of dispute resolution. 
This model does not require or assume a particular process 
through which disputes should be resolved. Nevertheless, given the 
cultural norms of litigation and the stories told within those norms, 
most disputants conceptualize their naming, blaming, claiming, and 
disputing through the story of litigation. As Felstiner, Abel and Sarat 
put it, "institutional patterns restrict the options open to disputants" 
who wish to pursue a "claim,"135 and the "normal" way to resolve 
disputes has long been litigation. 
"Institutional patterns," however, are not set in stone. Indeed, in 
the twenty odd years since the appearance of the Felstiner, Abel and 
Sarat article, the growth of mediation has generated new options for 
dispute resolution. Lawyers, as the cultural actors with prime respon-
sibility for enacting ways of "claiming" and "disputing," are especially 
well positioned to encourage clients to consider fresh "patterns" of 
dispute resolution such as mediation. While no doubt an enormous 
challenge, experience suggests that this is not an impossible one. The 
very fact that mediation can and does work with some frequency de-
spite the force of the litigation narrative demonstrates that lawyers 
in attorney-client interactions, see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of 
Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1447 (1992). 
\31 Felstiner, et al., supra note 44. For a recent elaboration by Austin Sarat of these 
ideas in the context of popular culture, see Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden Domains of 
Civil Justice: ''Naming, Blaming, and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
425 (2000). 
132 Felstiner, et al., supra note 44, at 635. 
\33 Id. 
134 Id. at 636. 
135 Id. at 636. 
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have at least a chance to dislodge the "truth" of the litigation frame 
when interacting with clients. 
A number of factors favor client receptivity to mediation even 
prior to client counseling. First, conceptions of conflict tend to be 
fluid and subject to reinterpretation. There is thus tension between 
the persistence and rigidity of the litigation narrative and the continu-
ing instability and reinterpretation of our experience.136 Tension in 
this context, however, is not necessarily a bad thing; lawyers can build 
upon the instability of conflict in order to encourage clients to reinter-
pret conflict in terms of alternative narratives. Second, the unsavory 
dimensions of litigation - its almost inevitable expense, delay, acri-
mony, and uncertainty, among other things - are commonplaces in 
popular culture and act as a powerful incentive to embrace alterna-
tives. Moreover, lawyers are, by definition, situated apart from cli-
ents' circumstances. This added distance enables a lawyer to see a 
client's perspective as a perspective, with other perspectives and sto-
ries potentially in play.137 
C. What About Client-Centered Lawyering? 
Before considering more specifically how lawyers can engage in 
136 This idea recalls the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, who wrote that language emdobies 
both "centrifugal" and "centripetal" forces that tend to pull in opoposite directions: cen-
tripetal forces, originating in political and cultural influences, unify meaning, while 
centrifugal forces, originating in "the plurality of experience," decentralize and destabilize 
meaning. M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION 271-72 (Michael Holquist ed. & 
Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans. 1981). 
137 The perspective I am proposing is that of an anti-formalist - a stance that holds that 
there is not a reality, but interpretations about reality that can in turn be reinterpreted, put 
together, and taken apart in lots of different ways. For a provocative vision of anti-formal-
ism and its consequences, see STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, 
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 1-33 
(1989). It should be noted that in a sense, good lawyers are already anti-formalists. In a 
classic study of Chicago lawyers conducted some thirty years ago, practitioners identified 
"understanding the viewpoints of others" as a primary skill in the practice of law. FRAN-
CES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 
125 (1981). Indeed, it is commonplace that astute lawyers consider the perspectives of 
adversaries to prepare for direct and cross-examination and to construct theories of the 
case. Similarly, effective negotiators examine events from the perspective of adversaries in 
order to anticipate their stance in the negotiation. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BASTRESS & 
JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLS FOR EF-
FECTIVE REPRESENTATION 407 (1990) (describing the importance of determining what 
"opponents mean when they describe historical facts, assert legal positions, or comment on 
other matters important to the negotiation"); HARRY T. EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, 
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR 112 (1977) (describing how "[i]n every negotiation a princi-
pal responsibility of the negotiator is to find his opponents' settling point"). Nevertheless, 
lawyers have classically employed these techniques in order to construct an effective story 
within the litigation narrative, not as a means to dislodge the litigation narrative in order to 
open space for alternative narratives of dispute resolution. 
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the types of client counseling that I am suggesting, one question is 
worth addressing: How does counseling clients about mediation fit in 
with "client-centered" lawyering and counseling?138 A classic client-
centered, non-interventionist approach holds that a lawyer's job is to 
"translate" a client's grievance in all of its complexity into language 
and strategies appropriate to legal process.139 This conception, quite 
rightly in my view, encourages lawyers to approach clients as autono-
mous agents embodying a complex web of legal and non-legal con-
cerns, not merely a set of legal issues or interests.140 
Problems arise, however, when a client-centered view assumes 
that clients come into lawyer's offices with preferences, opinions, and, 
most importantly for our purposes, narratives fixed. Such a view sug-
gests that in order to respect and vindicate a client's autonomy, a law-
yer must take a client as she is and preserve at all costs a client's 
preexisting sense of goals and conceptions of "what happened." This 
vastly simplifies the complexity, dynamism, and instability of the 
meaning-making process.141 
In fact, dislodging the litigation narrative is precisely what effec-
tive client-centered counseling has long been understood to be: an op-
portunity for lawyers to "expose clients to alternatives and 
consequences" in resolving a matter and "provide an opportunity to 
evaluate options and consequences."142 This process is a wonderfully 
effective means to explore whether mediation might be appropriate 
for a particular dispute, for client counseling, like mediation, em-
braces the here and now of the unique situation facing a unique client. 
Dislodging the litigation narrative does not mean that clients 
should cede autonomy to lawyers, or that lawyers manipulate clients 
to come around to what lawyers perceive to be a more positive view of 
138 The first and most influential treatment of client-centered lawyering is DAVID 
BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CEN-
TERED ApPROACH (1977). A more recent revision of this work IS DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL 
BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED Ap-
PROACH (1991). 
139 See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: 
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Christo-
pher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving 
and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 861 (1992). 
140 See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: 
The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1986); BINDER ET AL., supra note 138, 
at 261. 
141 I explore this point at greater length in Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client 
Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 148-59 (1999). For other criti-
ques and reappraisals of conceptions of client-centered lawyering, see Robert D. Diner-
stein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 
(1990). 
142 BINDER ET AL., supra note 138, at 272-80 (1991). 
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dispute resolution. Rather, a lawyer's job is to explode the myth of a 
thing called a "dispute" that gets resolved through a thing called "liti-
gation." This enables clients to exercise a meaningful choice about 
whether mediation is appropriate, thus vindicating client autonomy at 
its deepest level. 
VI. MEDIATION-TALK IN CLIENT COUNSELING: 
A PROPOSED TOOLKIT 
To restate the challenge: virtually all clients have long internal-
ized what trials look like (or at least what trials on television and in 
film look like) and what effective advocacy in that setting should be. 
As a result, a client is likely to conceptualize a case as a morality tale 
in which the client is right and adversaries are wrong, and conceive of 
her lawyer as a "zealous advocate" who will "fight" (the metaphor is 
telling) so that a client's cause will prevail. From this perspective, me-
diation-talk might seem "soft" or demonstrate a lack of commitment 
to the justice or truth of a client's cause.143 Some general description 
or definition of mediation - such as the one I quoted earlier144 - will 
likely fail in assisting a client in understanding what mediation is, let 
alone engage a client in what mediation can do. 
Thus, while the pursuit of mediation might well be in a client's 
interest for a host of reasons, many clients will at least initially view 
mediation - and lawyers who talk about the potential of mediation -
with skepticism. If clients are to make informed decisions about pur-
suing mediation and to participate meaningfully in mediation itself, 
clients must understand the process at as deep a level as possible. The 
following represents a toolkit from which lawyers can choose in order 
to make this happen. 
A. Holding Conflict at a Distance: "Managing Controversy" 
Litigation has been entrenched in popular imagination for so long 
that it has taken on the status of being a thing of nature. Its status as 
the way to resolve disputes is beyond question: shouts of "I'm going to 
take this court!" have meat and meaning, while "I'm going to take this 
to mediation!" sounds at best offbeat. 
143 See Sternlight, supra note 46, at 320 ("[c]lients typically hire attorneys with the idea 
that they will be their 'gladiators,' who will attempt to convince the world of the virtue of 
the clients' position"); Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution, 3 NEGOT. J. 29, 31 (1987) ("most clients, when it comes to their own 
matters, relish the concept of 'lawyer as hired gun' "). The specific expectations that clients 
have of lawyers also means that techniques employed by mediators to dislodge existing 
client narratives in mediation are not necessarily effective or applicable in an attorney-
client relationship. 
144 See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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Nevertheless, trends that I have identified in this article - the rise 
of the story of mediation and conceiving a lawyer as "problem-
solver"145 to take the two most prominent examples, although there 
are others146 - have begun ever so slowly to break through the mo-
nopoly that litigation advocacy has had on how lawyers and, by exten-
sion, of how clients view the world. These trends tend to normalize 
conflict by stripping away its right-wrong, religious-moral cast, 
thereby transforming conflict into a more natural and tractable 
phenomenon. 
This holds a lesson for counseling clients about mediation. In-
stead of merely assuming the familiar role of "zealous advocate," law-
yers can speak in explicit terms of a lawyer-client collaboration "to 
manage controversy."147 This approach is perhaps both most helpful 
and most counterintuitive when litigation appears to be the obvious, 
natural, and perhaps only course available to the client. Assume, for 
example, a commercial client who is outraged at the poor perform-
ance of another company with whom it had contracted to provide 
computer software and hardware. A template for a "managing con-
troversy" approach would be as follows: 
I hear how frustrated you've been and continue to be, and how you 
feel that you and your company have been taken advantage of. I 
also understand how much money your business has lost as a result 
of the failure of Computer Consultants to perform under the con-
145 See supra text accompanying notes 118-19. 
146 One example is "therapeutic jurisprudence," the task of which a leading commenta-
tor defines as "to identify - and ultimately to examine empirically - relationships between 
legal arrangements and therapeutic outcomes" as a means to pursue law reform. David B. 
Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in Es-
SAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 8 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds. 1991). 
See also Barbara A Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law Jurisprudence: 
Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L. J. 775 (1997). For 
connections between therapeutic jurisprudence and forms of mediation, see Gary Paquin 
& Linda Harvey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative Me-
diation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167 (2002). Another approach is 
called "preventive law," the purpose of which is to explore ways lawyers can help clients 
avoid future conflicts. See, e.g., ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAWYERING xl 
(1997) (preventive lawyering "deals with a published case as a kind of failure, representing 
an unfortunate breakdown in the system in which parties or lawyers failed to anticipate 
possible conflict and take preventive measures"). In yet another related trend, some law-
yers art, recognizing how taking a more holistic view of clients generates more effective 
representation and more satisfied clients. See, e.g,. David E. Rovella, The Best Defense . .. , 
NAT'L L. J. Jan. 31, 2000, at Al (describing indigent criminal defense attorneys who prac-
tice "holistic advocacy"); Steven Keeva, The Nicest Tough Firm Around, AB.A J., May 
1999, at 60 (describing personal injury firm in Michigan that has adopted a "holistic ap-
proach" to the needs of its clients). 
147 The formulation "conflict management" is often used in the literature on construct-
ing mechanisms within organizations to deal with conflict. See, e.g., COSTANTINO & 
MERCHANT, supra note 57. 
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tract, and how you think that your company will continue to lose 
money due to the problems with the computers. You've also asked 
me about suing Computer Consultants for damages, which is, 
you've told me, the option that you see as available and one that 
you'd like to discuss more. 
In thinking about what you can do, let's talk about ways to try to 
manage this situation in a way that best meets your goals. You've 
already mentioned litigation, something that certainly is an option. 
Another possibility to think about is mediation. Do you know any-
thing about mediation? 
Note that there is no dramatic shift here, no lightening bolts or 
surging violins. The lawyer does not - nor should - directly attack or 
contradict the Story of Litigation that has plainly informed the narra-
tive that the client has already shared. To the contrary, through con-
ventional techniques of "active listening" well-established in the 
interviewing and counseling literature,148 the lawyer "reflects back" 
the client's moral and emotional universe while, at the same time, not 
passing judgment on whether this universe is right or wrong, justified 
or unjustified. 
What the lawyer here and in succeeding interactions might do, 
however, is to begin the process of promoting a sense of disputes as 
constructions. The notion of conflict management does this by em-
bodying a distancing rhetoric: the act of managing conflict is necessa-
rily separate from the conflict itself. This opens up space between the 
representation and the controversy - a space that offers room to ex-
amine options and the stories that might be generated through these 
options - with greater clarity than might be otherwise possible.149 
Such a space does not exist when lawyer and client unreflectively as-
sume that litigation - or even settlement within the adversarial pro-
cess - is what the representation is about. 
Another virtue of this technique is that it serves as a kind of way 
station before the much riskier and problematic step of collaborating 
with an opposing party to resolve conflict. As attorney and client hold 
"controversy" up for examination, the role of the opposing party 
might shift from villain to something far less morally charged, say "an 
element of the controversy to be managed." With pragmatism ascen-
dant and the attorney modeling the value of collaboration, the next 
step - understanding the potential value of mediation as a collabora-
148 See, e.g., BINDER, ET AL, supra note 138, at 52-68. Interestingly, "active listening" is 
also a standard technique employed by mediators. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 70, at 165-
66. 
149 The technique and goals that I sketch here resonates with a strategy called "external-
izing conversation" that can be profitably employed by mediators as well. WINSLADE & 
MONK, supra note 20, at 143-47. 
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tion among all participants to resolve conflict - requires far less of a 
leap than it otherwise would. 
The "managing controversy" mode may therefore subtly shift a 
client's conception of conflict away from the usual and the accepted. 
This may reverberate in many directions, from altering the contours of 
the attorney-client relationship to shifting a client's sense of the con-
flict at issue are and how it may be resolved. 
B. The Cultural Norms Reflected in the Story of Mediation 
Some have observed an odd dynamic whereby cultural impera-
tives tend to be mutually contradictory: for every impulse to "love thy 
neighbor" there is another impulse to "stand up for your own," for 
every political impulse towards "compromise" and "bipartisanship" 
there is another impulse towards "principle" and "fighting for what 
you believe is right."150 
Despite the prevalence of the litigation morality tale, it is, of 
course, not the only tale people tell about the world. Certainly the 
distinctive characteristics of the Story of Litigation - its construction 
of a binary moral universe, its certainty of one truth and one true un-
derstanding of justice, its appeal to a higher power to vindicate moral-
ity and truth - all reflect deeply embedded cultural norms.15I That 
said, so does the Story of Mediation: its embrace of the subjectivity of 
experience ("there are two sides to every story"; "beauty is in the eye 
of the beholder"), of the creativity of collaboration ("two heads are 
better than one"), of the moral goodness and value of collaboration 
and cooperation when struggling to overcome a common enemy ("one 
for all and all for one";152 if "we don't hang together we shall all surely 
150 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 229. At least in terms of the Austere 
Definition of Narrative, what I am here calling "impulses" often structure experience in 
narrative terms. 
151 The reason why the story of litigation is so culturally resonant is a large and complex 
question beyond the scope of this Article. Some speculation on its origins: While positiv-
ism might be rare in the academy, popular Western culture tends to conceive of truth as 
truth and justice as justice. In addition, as a philosophical and perhaps psychological mat-
ter, the narratives that engage us most almost invariably involve human agents doing the 
right or wrong thing. There appears to be some sort of deep-seated human need in this: 
embracing the significance of circumstance or happenstance in causing events appears at 
best "soft" or at worst "scary," perhaps because it questions the role that "responsibility" 
plays in events, or the degree to which humans can control events. The so-called "prime 
attribution error" that I discussed earlier is an empirically demonstrated manifestation of 
this tendency. See supra note 43. Finally, as I also alluded to earlier, an appeal to a higher 
authority for justice and the vindication of morality reflects an important dimension of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. 
152 This is, of course, the cry of Alexandre Dumas' Three Musketeers, but the phrase has 
become a commonplace of popular culture. 
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hang separately"153) all resonate with dimensions of the cultural land-
scape that are alive and meaningful. 
As a result, while clients might not be used to approaching dis-
pute resolution in terms of the Story of Mediation, this is more an 
artifact of the current norms of dispute resolution than of the norms 
of experience more generally. The cultural resonance of the Story of 
Mediation is therefore fertile ground for lawyers to till in client coun-
seling. Lawyers can call to mind these norms by appropriating folk 
wisdom when describing the mediation process, by describing media-
tion processes that lawyers have experienced or observed that call to 
mind norms reflected by the Story of Mediation, and by asking clients 
about experiences that they might have had that reflect these norms. 
C. Telling the Story of Mediation 
A primary thrust of my approach thus far has been the central 
role that narrative plays in structuring our experience154 and, more 
particularly, the central role that narrative plays in structuring dis-
putes,155 The Story of Mediation and examples of stories that are told 
within the Story of Mediation therefore hold great explanatory power. 
In contrast, descriptions that are too analytic or dryly definitionaP56 
have scant power to evoke the potential of mediation. 
There are many ways to use narrative as a means to explain medi-
ation. One approach builds upon the narrative structure of mediation 
and litigation that I have already described.157 A lawyer's first chal-
lenge would be to defamiliarize the Story of Litigation by making this 
"natural," unremarkable process strange.158 This can be done in nar-
rative terms. Discourses on narrative theory are not necessary. For 
example, a lawyer can explain that litigation is a process through 
which parties seek to convince a decision-maker that they are factu-
ally and morally right. 159 This process generates a contest or struggle 
between parties in which there are designated winners and losers. In 
contrast, mediation promotes a process through which all participants 
- parties, lawyers, mediator - struggle not against one another, but to 
153 The remark is usually ascribed to Benjamin Franklin at the signing of the Declara-
tion of Independence, although this may be apocryphal. RONALD W. CLARK, BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN: A BIOGRAPHY 286 (1983). Whatever its historical grounding, this phrase has 
long passed into an oft-repeated piece of folk wisdom. 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 19-32. 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 33-110. 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 33-110. 
158 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 23, at 4. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 34-50. 
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collaborate to resolve conflict. 160 The distinctive aspects of mediation 
that I described earlier - mediation's focus on a client's "ownership" 
of the process, its focus on the present and future interests and cir-
cumstances rather than solely on "what happened," its breaking down 
of a unitary perspective, its open-ended expansiveness, its pragmatism 
- would further highlight how stories generated within mediation dif-
fer from the stories generated within litigation. 
Perhaps a crucial complement to this technique is to share "war 
stories" with clients. As lawyers gain experience in mediation or even 
as attorneys new to mediation read and learn more about it, the telling 
of actual stories of mediation (with, of course, the appropriate preser-
vation of confidentiality) brings the Story of Mediation to life in a real 
and compelling way. 
D. The Vocabulary of Mediation 
Words matter. While the law is full of jargon, much of the stan-
dard language of litigation has long infiltrated everyday discourse: 
"claims," "defends," "defenses," "argues," "positions," "rights." Even 
the procedural vocabulary peculiar to litigation is everywhere: "tes-
tify" "evidence" "relevance" "ruling" "J'udgment" These words are , , , , . 
suffused with the procedures and narrative entailments of litigation. 
The norms of mediation imply a different vocabulary: "interests," 
"goals," "resolutions," "facilitation," "cooperation," "collaboration," 
"perspectives." By avoiding the vocabulary of litigation - or even ex-
plicitly telling clients what this vocabulary is and what the vocabulary 
of mediation tends to be - a lawyer would be assisting a client in un-
derstanding mediation more thoroughly. Moreover, self-conscious 
adoption of these words when counseling clients may begin to gener-
ate a different set of "relevant facts" and, thus, a different "dispute," 
for these words implicate the story of mediation.161 
The use of these words is not merely an exercise in "softening" 
or, more colloquially, to make "touchy-feely" the process of dispute 
resolution. Indeed, a subtext of some critics of mediation - typically 
those with legal training - is that mediation is somehow less logical, 
rigorous or creative than litigation. Very much to the contrary, how-
ever, mediation can be and often is an extraordinarily creative enter-
prise on the part of the mediator and participating lawyers and 
parties. While the degree of creativity required in mediation extends 
beyond the scope of this article, a primary point of my discussion thus 
160 See supra text accompanying notes 97-110. 
161 As Winslade and Monk put it from the perspective of mediators conceptualizing 
mediation, "we can think of the talk we create in mediation as actually constructing experi-
ence." WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 20, at 39. 
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far - the importance of reconceptualizing disputes in terms of both the 
Story of Mediation and the Story of Litigation - constitutes no mean 
feat of intellectual legerdemain. The adoption of the vocabulary of 
mediation, therefore, represents a challenge for both lawyer and client 
that when identified explicitly as such can make it all the more appeal-
ing to the client. 
E. Considering the Opposite 
I have already alluded to how an accepted mediation technique is 
to encourage parties to consider the other side's perspective.l62 Some 
mediators do this by assigning written "homework" through which 
one party generates a list of items that would "support" the other 
side's perspective,]63 or by "asking each party to restate the opposing 
view before they put forth their response, position, or statement."]64 
This technique builds upon a rich social science literature that has 
validated a process called "considering the opposite" or "counterex-
planation."]65 The basic idea underlying this strategy is that humans 
assimilate information in line with what they already believe - a ten-
dency social psychologists call "confirmation bias."166 In the context 
of disputes, this means that a party will likely assimilate information 
relating to the dispute in a way that is consistent with that party's posi-
tion, or, to adopt the perspective of narrative theory, a party will inter-
pret information in a way that is consistent with that party's story. 
Information that is plainly incongruent and thus cannot be assimilated 
into the "true" story of "what happened" tends to be dismissed as 
distorted, false or irrelevant. Considering the opposite combats this 
tendency by encouraging an active consideration of opposite perspec-
tives by constructing justifications for that perspective. The key here 
is that the consideration must be active: merely "listening" - even in 
good faith - to another side does not work because information will 
]62 See supra text accompanying notes 76-8l. 
163 Elisa T. Deener, A Mediation Tale: A Reading from the Contextual Legal Criticism 
Perspective (unpublished article) (on file with author). 
164 KOVACH, supra note 63, at 140. 
165 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord, Mrak R. Lepper, & Elizabeth Preston, Considering the 
Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1231 (1984); Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider the 
Alternative Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1069 
(1995); Craig A. Anderson & Elizabeth S. Sechler, Effects of Counterexplanation on the 
Development and Use of Social Theories, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 24 (1986); 
Asher Koriat et aI., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. LEARN-
ING & MEMORY 107 (1980). For a general discussion description of this technique in an-
other context, see Rubinson, supra note 36, at 32-34. 
166 Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal 
History, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 603, 606 (1980). 
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still either be assimilated into the "true story" or discarded if this is 
not possible. Exhortations to be "as objective and unbiased as possi-
ble" do not work for the same reason.167 
Given that "considering the opposite" tends to achieve greater 
openness to alternative perspectives, lawyers might consider a similar 
"homework assignment" for clients. While at first blush this might 
seem preposterous or paternalistic, it is accepted practice - indeed, it 
is often good lawyering - for lawyers to ask clients to find documents, 
witnesses, or perform other tasks related to representation or to un-
dertake mock cross-examinations to prepare a witness.168 The process 
of considering the opposite might well produce an intuitive under-
standing of the constructed nature of disputes by highlighting an alter-
native narrative of a dispute. 
Needless to say, this is the riskiest, most dangerous tool in the kit, 
albeit one with perhaps the greatest potential of all. It might be well 
to only employ this after using other tools first, and only with clients 
lawyers predict will be receptive to it. In any event, it would be pre-
posterous to simply suggest this to a client without an explanation. 
Clients might well suspect that an attorney is being disloyal, or not 
fully fighting for the transparent justice of the client's cause.169 Never-
theless, it seems to me perfectly acceptable to openly disclose to the 
client the purpose of the exercise and the legal and psychological basis 
for it, and to propose - albeit with discretion and a sense of how well 
it might be received - that it might generate for the lawyer and client 
creative and potentially effective means to manage the client's 
conflict. 
CONCLUSION 
Disputes are extraordinarily complex events whose stories can be 
told and retold in a multitude of ways. In the past, lawyers have em-
braced this idea within the context of litigation. With the rise of medi-
ation, however, the norms of litigation and the stories these norms 
generate are no longer the only ones in play. To the contrary, it is now 
clear that the nature of a dispute - what a dispute fundamentally is -
is contingent upon how lawyers describe alternative modes of dispute 
resolution to clients and which mode or modes lawyers and clients 
ultimately choose to employ. 
Mediation therefore is far more than an "alternative" to litiga-
167 See, e.g., Lord et aI., supra note 165, at 1233-37. 
168 See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 51 (6th ed. 2002) 
169 Of course, such complications are inherent whenever attorneys - as they often must 
- seek to deflate client expectations or explore inconsistencies about a case. See, e.g., Ster-
nlight, supra note 46, at 320-321; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 137, at 273-282. 
874 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:833 
tion: it is a new way of telling stories about the world. These new 
stories are worth telling or at least exploring, and lawyers who meet 
the challenges of doing so enrich and expand the means through 
which both lawyers and clients resolve disputes. 
